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Abstract 
We investigate the association between a new XBRL based measure of accounting reporting 
complexity (ARC) and analyst behavior. We find that analysts are less likely to cover firms with 
complex accounting. Further, higher ARC is associated with lower forecast accuracy, higher 
forecast dispersion, and lower informativeness of recommendation revisions and responsiveness 
to earnings announcements. This association is attenuated when analysts have longer tenure, 
greater firm-specific experience, and are focused on fewer industries. Investigating several 
complex accounts, we find that the complexity of derivatives, fair value, and pension accounts are 
each negatively associated with forecast accuracy, suggesting that understanding these complex 
accounts requires specialization. We propose a new measure of analysts’ account-specific 
expertise and find that expertise with derivative and fair value accounts attenuates the negative 
effects of complexity in these accounts to a greater extent than general analyst experience. Overall, 
our findings suggest that analysts’ expertise plays an important role in mitigating the adverse 
effects of ARC.  
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The Effect of Accounting Reporting Complexity on Financial Analysts 
I. Introduction 
Regulators and standard setters have long recognized that financial reporting has become 
overly complicated (SEC 2008; FRC 2009). As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) undertook several initiatives to 
understand and simplify the financial reports (e.g. SEC 2008; FASB 2016). In this study, we 
examine how accounting reporting complexity (hereafter, ARC), measured as the count of 
accounting items disclosed in eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) 10-K filings, is 
associated with financial analysts’ performance and coverage decisions. Since each accounting 
item is based on authoritative standards and regulations, understanding the financial reports of 
firms with higher ARC necessitates broader and more in-depth knowledge of accounting.  
While Hoitash and Hoitash (2017) find that more accounting disclosure complicates the 
work of preparers and auditors, it is unclear how disclosure volume will be associated with the 
work of sophisticated market participants such as financial analysts. Greater volume of accounting 
disclosures can help analysts understand past performance and generate more accurate forecasts. 
Indeed, several studies find that more disaggregated disclosures can lead to better analyst 
performance (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Chen et al. 2015). In contrast, more disclosure requires 
greater knowledge of accounting rules and regulations on part of financial analysts and a need to 
collect, analyze, and incorporate more information into their predictions. As a result, ARC may 
hurt overall analyst performance or even discourage analysts from covering certain firms.1  
                                                 
1 It is well established that financial analysts rely on the information that is disclosed in the financial reports. Ramnath, 
Rock and Shane (2008) list three primary sources that analysts use to form their recommendations (1) SEC filings (2) 
Industry and macroeconomic conditions and (3) Conference call and other management communications.  
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We rely on a report by the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial 
Reporting (ACIFR hereafter, SEC 2008) and define the user-centric aspect of ARC as: the 
difficulty for financial statement users to understand and analyze detailed economic activities and 
firm performance from the accounting disclosures in 10-K filings. We construct a measure of ARC 
using eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) filings with the SEC.2,3 The XBRL 
taxonomy, maintained by FASB, contains a comprehensive list of nearly 16,000 tags that 
companies can use to report accounting information. Each tag depicts a GAAP concept such as 
inventory (e.g. the tag “InventoryGross” represents gross inventory) and refers to an authoritative 
accounting standard and regulation.4 We compute ARC as the total number of tags used in Item 8 
of the 10-K annual SEC filings. Therefore, as the number of tags increases, greater volume of 
accounting information is disclosed in SEC filings.5 ARC is principally different from other firm-
level proxies for complexity such as readability (Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011) or disclosure 
fineness (Chen et al. 2015) because it focuses on all monetary accounting disclosures that are 
directly obtained from company filings. 
                                                 
2 We recognize that ARC can be measured in different ways and recognize that using volume we capture only one, 
albeit important, dimension of accounting reporting complexity.  
3 Under SEC rules (SEC 2009), firms must faithfully translate the financial statements and notes in Item 8 of their 
10-K filings into XBRL. Therefore, the number of XBRL tags reported mimics the same information firms disclose 
in their HTML filings. Early research, questions the quality of company disclosures. Our research design, however, 
is primarily unaffected by this issue because we rely on the meta-data (tag names) instead of the actual disclosed 
values. 
4 In cases where an appropriate tag is unavailable, companies can create their own tags (referred to as extensions 
because the new tags extend the taxonomy). We note that the use of extended tags is, at times, unwarranted. In fact, 
past research finds that firms may unnecessarily use extended tags (Debreceny et al. 2011). Nevertheless, an 
increased use of extensions reduces the use of tags that appear in the Taxonomy. Since ARC equals the overall 
number of tags, it is ambivalent to whether companies use extensions or not. In the sensitivity analysis section, we 
separate extensions and taxonomy tags and repeat our analyses.  
5 Whether or not analysts actually rely on XBRL disclosures, on HTML filings, or on information from data 
aggregators does not influence our investigation. In fact, it is assumed that analysts do not directly use XBRL 




We hypothesize that it is more difficult for analysts to assess the current and future 
performance of firms with greater ARC for several reasons. First, past research suggests that more 
information contributes to task complexity (e.g., Steinmann 1976; Campbell 1988; Bonner 1994). 
In addition, firms that use a higher number of XBRL tags reference more accounting standards. 
Incorporating these accounting concepts into profitability calculations is difficult because it 
requires a broader and more diverse knowledge of accounting standards and regulations.6 Finally, 
ARC can influence financial analysts’ cost-benefit considerations. Specifically, the amount of time 
and resources that analysts need to commit to extract, incorporate, analyze, and interpret 
accounting data increases with the supply of accounting information. As a result, analysts may fail 
to invest sufficient time to understand and fully incorporate the disclosures of complex firms into 
their analyses. 
Our objective is to investigate three aspects of sell-side analysts’ behavior. First, does ARC 
serve as a determinant of analysts’ decision to cover a company? Second, is accounting complexity 
associated with analyst performance as measured by forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and 
the informativeness of their stock recommendation revisions? Third, can analyst experience, 
expertise, and industry focus moderate the effect of ARC? We examine these questions in a sample 
of 6,232 firm-year observations between 2011 and 2014. 
At the outset, we examine the association between ARC and analysts’ coverage. Evidence 
on the coverage of complex firms primarily shows that complex firms receive more coverage. 
Specifically, more complex firms in terms of intangibles, firm size, and financial statement 
                                                 
6 In many ways, accounting complexity is a result of complex economic activities. By construction, the objective of 
the financial reports is to “communicate the economic substance of a transaction or event and the overall financial 
position and results of a company” (SEC 2008). Therefore, although we measure accounting reporting complexity, 
we also capture business complexity. Regardless, we are unaware of detailed measures of business complexity that 
exist for a large cross-section of firms. In the sensitivity analysis section, we perform analysis that disentangle ARC 
from observable measures of operating complexity.   
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readability have higher analyst following (Barth et al. 2001; Lehavy et al. 2011). In contrast, scant 
evidence documents that more complex firms are associated with lower coverage (Bhushan 1989). 
Different from most prior research, our results show that as ARC rises, analysts’ coverage declines. 
These results are stronger for smaller brokerage houses, possibly because smaller brokers 
selectively cover firms and are therefore more likely to consider ARC in their cost-benefit 
considerations. Although the need for sophisticated intermediaries is greater as information 
becomes more complex (e.g., Palmon and Yezegel 2012), analysts are less likely to cover such 
firms, thus making it particularly hard to predict the performance of complex firms.  
We predict that ARC will adversely affect analysts’ performance in terms of forecast 
accuracy, forecast dispersion, the informativeness of stock recommendations, and their 
responsiveness to earnings announcements. However, since ARC measures the amount of reported 
accounting information, it is possible that it will be positively associated with analyst performance. 
Indeed, past research finds that more detailed disclosures can reduce mispricing (Fairfield et al. 
1996) and increase the credibility of the financial reports because disaggregation is believed to 
reduce managers ability to manage earnings (D’Souza et al. 2010). Using a measure of overall 
disclosure quality, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find a positive association between increased 
disclosure and analyst performance. Surprisingly, few studies examine the association between 
disclosure volume and analysts performance. 
In a recent study, Chen et al. (2015) propose and test a measure of disclosure quality (DQ) 
based on the level of disaggregation of financial information in Compustat and find that DQ is 
associated with higher forecast accuracy and lower dispersion. An important distinction between 
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DQ and ARC is that DQ is based on a particular set of Compustat items.7 Indeed, we find that the 
correlation between the two measures is negative, suggesting that they capture different 
constructs.8 Consistent with ARC measuring complexity, we find that higher ARC (more 
disclosure) is associated with lower forecast accuracy, higher forecast dispersion, lower 
informativeness of stock recommendations revisions and less responsiveness to earnings 
announcements. These findings suggest that a greater volume of accounting disclosures that ARC 
measures is detrimental to the performance of financial analysts. We document that our results are 
not sensitive to several alternative methods to construct ARC. Further, we show that using the 
residuals from a model that regresses ARC on firm size, operating complexity, and industry and 
year fixed effects, produce similar results. This suggests that ARC captures complexity that is 
incremental to firm size and operating complexity.  
We next examine how experience, industry focus, and expertise of financial analysts 
moderate the association between ARC and analyst performance. Prior research investigates the 
benefits of experience (Clement 1999; Mikhail et al. 1997) but to the best of our knowledge does 
not examine circumstances, such as complexity, under which the benefits of experience could vary. 
Using analyst-firm-year sample we find that general experience (tenure as analyst in years), firm-
specific experience (number of years the analyst covered the firm), and industry focus (number of 
industries the analyst cover) attenuate the negative influence of ARC. These results suggest that 
experienced and focused analysts are better positioned to use more nuanced disclosures. 
We further explore whether the complexity attributed to specific account categories that 
are inherently difficult-to-understand influences the performance of financial analysts and whether 
                                                 
7 The objective of the Chen et al. (2015) study is different as they focus on the completeness of disclosure as a measure 
of disclosure fineness. They rely on about 145 Compustat items while our study considers several thousand items. We 
thank Chen, Miao, and Shevlin for graciously sharing with us their most recent data. 
8 When we include DQ in our models, our sample size declines by more than 60%, but our ARC results remain similar.  
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analysts’ expertise in these specific accounts can mitigate this effect. Previous studies constructed 
novel measures to capture detailed account specific complexity (Picconi 2006; Magnan et al. 2015; 
Chang et al. 2016). Guided by these studies we construct ARC measures in three categories of 
particularly complex accounts: pensions, fair values, and derivatives. We construct these account-
specific complexity measures by counting the reported XBRL tags in each account. Different from 
previous studies, our approach for measuring ARC in these accounts is uniform across accounts, 
is not sample or event specific, and can be extended to other accounts. Constructing these account-
specific proxies for complexity is unattainable with measures of readability because it requires a 
precise measurement of the accounting context. We find that complexity in fair value, derivatives, 
and pension is associated with lower forecast accuracy. 
Finally, we present a new approach for measuring analysts’ expertise in specific accounts. 
We measure the degree of analyst expertise by counting the number of XBRL tags that analysts 
cover across their portfolio of firms. We conjecture that analysts who cover more account specific 
tags gain expertise in these accounts. This approach for measuring analyst account specific 
expertise is new and cannot be easily accomplished without XBRL data. We find that analyst 
expertise in fair value and derivatives attenuates the detrimental effect of complexity. Interestingly, 
this form of nuanced expertise weakens the negative effect of account specific complexity to a 
greater extent than general and firm specific analyst experience. 
Our study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, using a broad 
measure of accounting reporting complexity we demonstrate that complexity is inversely 
associated with analysts’ coverage and performance. These results support efforts to simplify 
accounting disclosures and are inconsistent with the view that more disclosure is always beneficial 
to financial statement users. Second, we contribute to the analyst literature that uses different 
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methods to measure complexity of specific accounts (Gu and Wang 2005; Chang et al. 2016) by 
offering a unified method that is based on the FASB XBRL taxonomy. This method is 
straightforward, objective, consistent across different accounts, can be extended to other accounts 
and is not limited to certain samples, periods, or events. Third, while past research shows that 
certain aspects of reporting complexity influence analyst performance, we are unaware of research 
that examines circumstances under which the negative effects are attenuated. We find that 
analysts’ experience and industry focus can mitigate the adverse consequences detected. Finally, 
we propose a new approach to measure analysts’ account specific expertise and demonstrate that 
this form of expertise is more beneficial than general experience when specific accounts are more 
complex.  
The empirical evidence that we present has several important implications for regulators, 
standard-setters, investors, creditors, and brokerage houses. Regulators should take note of the 
adverse consequences of ARC on analyst coverage and performance. Our results suggest that even 
sophisticated financial statement users face challenges when financial reports are complex. 
Similarly, investors and creditors should be cautious when considering analyst forecasts for firms 
with complex accounting. Our results highlight both a challenge and an opportunity for brokerage 
houses and sell-side analysts. Additional investment directed towards understanding the nuances 
in complex accounting standards may help analysts issue more accurate and timely forecasts. 
Further, the difficulties associated with processing complex accounting information and the 
importance of experience, expertise, and industry focus should be considered in cost-benefit 




Among users of financial statements, sell-side analysts are often viewed as experts in 
understanding and interpreting accounting disclosures. Accounting information is chiefly obtained 
from filings with the SEC and is one of the three primary sources that analysts use to prepare their 
reports (Ramnath et al. 2008). Regulators and standard setters voiced concerns about the increased 
complexity of the financial reports (SEC 2006) and initiated simplification efforts (SEC 2008; 
FASB 2016). The complexity of accounting disclosures in SEC filings significantly differs across 
firms and industries and can potentially influence analysts’ coverage and performance. In our 
context, complex accounting disclosure can be viewed as the difficulty for financial statement 
users to understand and analyze detailed economic activities and firm performance from annual 
10-K filings. Measuring this aspect of complexity is difficult and reliable broad accounting-based 
proxies are not widely available. 
Accounting complexity and XBRL   
We rely on a new approach that uses detailed information in the eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL) to measure the accounting complexity in financial reports. Under 
SEC rules (SEC 2009), firms must faithfully translate the financial statements and notes in Item 8 
of their 10-K filings into XBRL, which is a computer language used to communicate financial data 
electronically. In XBRL, each accounting concept is depicted with a distinct XBRL tag. Each tag 
refers to authoritative accounting standards and/or regulations.9 Financial statements of firms that 
use a larger number of XBRL tags require reliance on more accounting standards and are therefore 
more complex to prepare. Consistently, using an accounting complexity measure that is based on 
the count of XBRL accounting items, Hoitash and Hoitash (2017) find that increased accounting 
                                                 
9 For example, to represent net sales, companies can use the following XBRL tag: <us-gaap:SalesRevenueNet>. To 




complexity presents challenges for preparers, leading to financial reports that are more susceptible 
to errors and misapplications of GAAP. 
Different from preparers, analysts do not produce financial reports. Instead, they use 
information disclosed within financial reports to formulate their predictions. Therefore, studies 
that examine the association between aspects of financial reporting complexity and analysts’ 
performance focus on the difficulty in processing and interpreting the information in financial 
reports. Linguistic complexity is one feature that increases the difficulty in consuming the reports. 
The most commonly used measure of linguistic complexity is the Gunning (1952) Fog Index. This 
index measures the readability and the difficulty to consume the financial reports. Indeed, Lehavy 
et al. (2011) and Bozanic and Thevenot (2015) find that less readable reports are associated with 
poor analyst performance. While linguistic complexity is associated with inferior analyst 
performance, it is unclear whether it captures accounting complexity.  
The Fog index focuses on the written narrative of the financial reports and cannot 
distinguish between accounting and non-accounting communications. In addition, unlike an 
accounting based measure of complexity, it is not possible to disaggregate the Fog index into topic-
specific components. While it is possible that less readable reports are the result of accounting 
complexity, the XBRL based complexity measure is negatively correlated with the Fog index. This 
negative correlation is consistent with Li (2008), who finds that reports are less readable due to 
management incentives to obfuscate bad news, rather than the underlying information being 
complex. It is therefore likely that the Fog Index captures a different aspect of complexity.  
Other studies show that overall operating complexity is detrimental to analyst performance 
(Duru and Reeb 2002). Few studies concentrate on specific accounts and demonstrate that 
increased complexity in these accounts can hinder analysts’ performance (Plumlee 2003; Gu and 
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Wang 2005; Chang et al. 2016). The accounting complexity measure employed in this study is 
different from previous measures of linguistic and account-specific complexity because it captures 
the overall accounting complexity of the firm without focusing on a specific account.  
III. Hypotheses Development 
Analyst coverage  
Analysts’ decision to cover firms is important because the costs and benefits of coverage are rarely 
clear a priori. This decision principally depends on the cost and expected utility to the brokerage 
house and the analyst. Increased complexity introduces greater processing costs for investors. As 
a result, analysts may enjoy greater opportunities for profitable investment recommendations and 
higher trading commissions when complexity is high. Past research finds that firm size, trading 
volume, profitability outlook, earnings smoothness, presentations to analysts, voluntary 
disclosures, and stock beta are positively related to the number of analysts covering a firm 
(Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Previts et al. 1994; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; 
Francis and Soffer 1997; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Botosan and Harris 2000; Bradley et al. 2003). 
Concentrating on specific accounting features, Barth et al. (2001) find that analysts’ coverage 
increases with intangible assets. They conclude that firms with more intangible assets have greater 
potential for mispricing and information asymmetry because the values of intangible assets are 
seldom disclosed in financial statements. As a result, analysts may be motivated to cover these 
firms, which are expected to produce greater brokerage income. Similarly, Lehavy et al. (2011) 
find that analysts are more inclined to cover firms with less readable 10-K filings. Together, these 
studies suggest that analysts are more likely to cover complex firms.  
In contrast, the costs associated with processing complex information and the risk of 
issuing less accurate estimates for complex firms may discourage analysts from providing 
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coverage. Supporting this, Bhushan (1989) finds a negative relationship between the number of 
business lines and analyst coverage. Based on these results, he argues that covering multiple 
industries introduces costs that exceed expected utility. This suggests that as complexity and the 
related cost of providing coverage increases, analysts are less likely to provide firms with coverage. 
Overall, the literature provides conflicting results when examining the association between 
specific aspects of firm complexity and analyst coverage. Yet, prior research does not examine the 
association between a holistic measure of accounting reporting complexity and analyst coverage. 
Examining this issue is important because complexity is a multi-faceted construct and companies 
can be complex along certain aspects and simple along others. Therefore, focusing on a specific 
company characteristic or account may distort the results. Since previous studies yield 
contradicting results, we propose the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H1: There is no association between analysts following and accounting complexity.  
Analyst performance  
Numerous studies examine components of analyst performance, such as forecast accuracy (Brown 
et al. 1987; Kross et al. 1990), forecast dispersion (Hope 2003a), the informativeness of stock 
recommendations (Palmon and Yezegel 2012) and the responsiveness of analysts to earnings 
announcements (Zhang 2008; Lehavy et al. 2011; Yezegel 2015). Many conclude that the accuracy 
and dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts depend on the difficulty of the forecasting task. 
Obtaining, analyzing, and interpreting more accounting information can complicate the task of 
generating accurate forecasts and recommendations because like most business actors, analysts 
face economic resource constraints and can only devote limited time, staff, and effort to each 
forecast. When complexity rises, more resources are needed to produce accurate forecasts. Further, 
even with adequate resources, complex information is harder to understand because it requires 
 12 
 
greater knowledge to assess current and future performance. Studies examining significant 
changes in the economics of companies suggest that complex activities reduce analysts’ ability to 
produce accurate forecasts. For example, research finds that complexity as measured by merger 
activity (Haw et al. 1994) and international diversification (Duru and Reeb 2002) hinders analyst 
performance. Others focus on the complexity of certain accounts and conjecture that as complexity 
increases, analyst performance suffers. For example, using the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Plumlee 
(2003) shows that analysts’ revisions of effective tax rate forecasts incorporate simple tax law 
changes but not complex ones. Similarly, Gu and Wang (2005) find that firms’ intangible intensity 
is associated with lower forecast accuracy, and Chang et al. (2016) show that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for new derivative users are less accurate and more dispersed. Overall, several studies 
find that as complexity rises, analyst performance declines. This conclusion is consistent with a 
decline in judgment quality as task complexity increases (Payne 1976; Payne et al. 1988; Bonner 
1994). Yet, research that directly links broad measures of accounting complexity to analysts’ 
performance is scarce. 
We hypothesize that the inverse relation between forecast accuracy and complexity 
documented in prior research translates into a similar inverse relation between the value of stock 
recommendations and complexity. Analysts use models that rely heavily on earnings forecasts to 
value companies and base their recommendations on these valuations. Indeed prior research (Loh 
and Mian 2006), finds that analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more 
valuable stock recommendations. These results indicate that earnings forecasts serve as a critical 
input into analysts’ valuation models. Consistently, we predict that to the extent that analysts’ 




Analysts’ responsiveness to earnings announcement measures the timeliness of their 
forecasts and the effort they exert. Responsiveness, therefore, represents another dimension of 
analysts’ performance. Investors frequently seek advice from analysts to make trading decisions, 
and because investors need help in interpreting new information, the demand for advice tends to 
increase following new public information arrivals (Yezegel 2015). One common type of event 
that often prompts investors to seek guidance from analysts is the earnings announcement. Prior 
research shows that when analysts are more responsive to earnings announcements, the post-
earnings announcement drift tends to be smaller in magnitude, indicating higher market efficiency 
(Zhang 2008). However, when accounting complexity is higher, analysts will need to exert more 
effort and time before issuing their forecasts. Consistently, Lehavy et al. (2011) show that when 
financial reports are less readable it takes analysts more time for to issue forecasts. Similar 
evidence does not exist with respect to accounting complexity. Nevertheless, we predict that that 
when the accounting reporting is complex analysts will be less responsive following earnings 
announcements as they need to exert more effort and time to issue their forecasts.  
The XBRL based measure captures accounting complexity under the premise that more 
accounting disclosures reference more accounting standards, which we posit generates task 
difficulty that may hinder analyst performance. However, it is also plausible that increased 
disclosure of accounting information, captured by the XBRL measure, can have a positive effect 
on analyst performance because additional disclosures more faithfully reflect underlying firm 
economics. This can potentially assist analysts in forming more accurate forecasts and releasing 
more impactful recommendation revisions. Indeed, past research finds that analysts’ forecasts are 
more accurate when companies provide a greater level of disclosure about their accounting policies 
(Hope 2003a). Further, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with higher-quality disclosures 
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have lower forecast dispersion and smaller forecast errors. Similarly, Lang et al. (2003) find that 
cross-listed foreign firms that disclose more information are associated with greater forecast 
accuracy.10 Most related to our investigation, Chen et al. (2015) find that disclosure quality, 
measured based on the level of disaggregation of Compustat accounting line items in the financial 
reports, is associated with lower forecast dispersion and higher forecast accuracy. Overall, past 
research often suggests that the volume of disclosed accounting information is beneficial to 
financial analysts.  
Although the XBRL based measure can capture the amount of accounting information 
disclosed by firms, Hoitash and Hoitash (2017) demonstrate that it is more consistent with 
accounting complexity. Since several studies show that certain aspects of financial report 
complexity hinder analysts’ performance, we predict that a broad measure of accounting 
complexity will be associated with less accurate and more dispersed forecasts, less informative 
stock price recommendations, and lower analyst responsiveness. We formulate this prediction in 
the following hypothesis.  
H2a: There is a negative (positive) association between accounting complexity and 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (dispersion). 
 
H2b: There is a negative association between accounting complexity and the value of 
analysts’ recommendations. 
 
H2c: There is a negative association between accounting complexity and analysts’ 
responsiveness to earnings announcements. 
 
Analyst experience and industry focus 
Prior research shows that analyst forecast accuracy improves with experience. This research finds 
that general experience, defined as the number of years as a financial analyst (Clement 1999), and 
                                                 
10 It is also possible that forecast accuracy will increase and dispersion will decline if analysts of complex clients 
increase their mimicking behavior (Welch, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005). 
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firm specific experience, defined as the number of years covering a specific firm (Mikhail et al. 
1997), are each associated with greater forecast accuracy. This improved performance is attributed 
to analysts’ ability to more successfully incorporate macroeconomic trends and firm-specific 
information into their predictions. Given that accounting complexity is often innate to firms and 
their specific economic activities, we predict that over time analysts can gain knowledge and 
experience that helps them effectively navigate complex financial reports. The adverse effects of 
complexity on analysts’ performance can potentially be attenuated as analysts’ general and firm-
specific experience increase.  
In addition to general and firm specific knowledge, several studies find that analysts’ 
industry knowledge is valuable (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Kadan et al. 2012).11 Most 
recently, Brown et al. (2015) conduct extensive interviews with sell-side analysts and find that 
industry knowledge is the single most useful input into analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations. Consistently, Clement (1999) find that analyst performance is higher when 
analysts cover fewer industries. In our context, it is possible that analysts with greater industry 
focus will successfully apply their knowledge to understand the industry specific accounting 
intricacies in a way that will attenuate the potential detrimental impact of accounting complexity 
on their forecast predictions. This discussion leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The negative effect of accounting complexity on forecast accuracy is lower among 
analysts who possess greater general and firm-specific experience, and among analysts 
who focus on fewer industries.  
 
Account specific analyst expertise 
                                                 
11 In a related paper, Bradshaw et al. (2009) find that atypical accounting methods impede analysts’ performance, 
suggesting that analysts specialize in covering specific methods within industries and deviation from common industry 
methods can be detrimental to their work. 
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While prior research examines how general experience is associated with analyst 
performance, the extant literature lacks an empirical analysis of analyst expertise in specific 
accounts. Examining this issue is important because recent research shows that account specific 
complexity is negatively associated with analyst performance. For example, Picconi (2006) finds 
that analysts fail to fully incorporate and interpret information contained in pension disclosures. 
Similarly, using a sample of banking firms, Magnan et al. (2015) report that level 2 fair value 
disclosures enhance forecast accuracy, while level 3 fair value disclosures increase forecast 
dispersion. Finally, Chang et al. (2016) examine the relation between analysts’ performance and 
derivatives and find that analysts’ earnings forecasts for new derivative users are less accurate and 
more dispersed. They conclude that accounting for derivatives creates a financial reporting 
challenge because they represent a complex financial contract. Overall, extant research suggests 
that analysts struggle to fully incorporate information in these complex accounts.12  
To date, past research has not examined channels through which analysts can alleviate the 
observed inferior performance. We propose that through their work on their portfolio of clients, 
analysts can develop high level of technical accounting expertise. Specifically, analysts who 
frequently encounter specific account categories are likely to rationalize the allocation of 
additional time to understand complex accounting topics, because the potential knowledge gains 
can be used across their clients’ portfolios. This form of expertise is consistent with the learning 
by doing model proposed in a similar context by Mikhail et al. (1997). We predict that analysts 
who gain account specific expertise in pension, fair-value, and derivative accounts will perform 
                                                 
12 Pensions, fair value, and derivatives have also received significant attention from standard setters. The FASB 
included several of these accounts in the simplification initiative, suggesting that these are complex accounts (FASB 
Simplification Project 2016).  
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better in companies where these accounts are complex. We formulate this prediction in the 
following hypothesis. 
H4: There is a negative effect of account specific complexity on forecast accuracy and this 
effect is attenuated when analysts possess greater account specific expertise. 
 
IV. Sample and Methodology 
Construction of accounting complexity 
In 2009, the SEC passed the “Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting” rule, which 
requires companies to provide financial statement information in an XBRL format (SEC 2009).13 
The SEC phased in the rule over three years based on company filing status. The rule requires 
companies to tag each numerical value in Item 8 of the 10-K filings. Each tag represents an 
accounting concept such as net inventory, raw materials, or net revenue. We rely on detailed tag-
level XBRL data filed with the SEC to measure accounting complexity. We obtained the necessary 
XBRL data from Calcbench, which is an XBRL data provider.14 The data includes all XBRL tag 
names, the period of each tag as well as a variable indicating whether the tag represents a monetary 
accounting concept.  
We start with 12,926 XBRL filings of 10-K reports for fiscal years 2011-2014 and 
implement a number of filters, which we describe in Table 2 Panel A.15 Our final sample, after 
limiting the sample to observations with coverage in Compustat and imposing several other 
constraints, consists of 6,232 firm-year observations and 112,950 annual analyst earnings 
                                                 
13 More information on the XBRL taxonomy, tags and extensions is available at the following link: https://xbrl.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/PreparersGuide.pdf .  
14 Calcbench is a provider of XBRL financial data, peer benchmarking, detailed analytics, and other XBRL based 
tools (www.calcbench.com). Calcbench is the primary provider of XBRL based financial data to the SEC. Since 
Calcbench extracts XBRL tags directly from SEC filings using a standard method, our measure is not based on 
subjective judgment and could be easily replicated. 
15 The initial sample received from Calcbench includes 20,437 annual report filings.  
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estimates.16 Table 2 Panel B indicates that the fiscal years between 2012 and 2014 are roughly 
equally represented in the final sample whereas fiscal year 2011 has less than half of the average 
number of firms for the period 2012-2014. The relatively small sample size for fiscal year 2011 is 
primarily due to the SEC’s phased implementation of the rule governing XBRL submissions.17 
Overall Accounting Complexity 
 In XBRL filings, each concept is depicted by a tag that is numerical, textual, or date-
oriented. Each tag in the XBRL U.S. GAAP taxonomy is assigned a name and a label and includes 
other attributes such as definition, data type (monetary or string), balance type (credit/debit), and 
period type (instant for balance sheet items, or duration for income statement items). The goal of 
the taxonomy is to define a universe of XBRL tags that enable companies to report all of their 
accounting concepts. In other words, it allows companies to present their traditional HTML filings 
in XBRL. Although the taxonomy is comprehensive (includes nearly 16,000 tags), companies may 
have disclosure needs beyond the taxonomy. XBRL’s design enables companies to extend the 
taxonomy and create unique tags (extensions) that meet their needs. 
The primary test variable is a measure of accounting reporting complexity (ARC). The 
construction of ARC follows Hoitash and Hoitash (2017) and begins with all reported monetary 
XBRL tags in Item 8 of the 10-K filings. Each tag refers to accounting standards and regulations. 
Therefore, more tags suggest greater accounting complexity because more accounting knowledge 
is required to understand the financial reports. However, since specific tags repeat within a 
particular disclosure (statement/note/table), we only count distinct tags in each disclosure. Tags 
that recur do not necessarily increase complexity because their underlying accounting is similar. 
                                                 
16 We retain only the last annual estimates that analysts issue before the earnings announcement. 
17 Specifically, smaller filers were not required to file XBRL reports that include the financial statement notes until 
2012. As we describe later, removing 2011 from our sample does not alter our results. 
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This repetition typically happens in comparable financial statements that firms are required to 
report. For example, the tag “NetIncomeLoss” will repeat three times in the statement of cash flow 
because it is disclosed for the current and the prior two years. In such instances, we only include 
the tag that refers to the current year. In the sensitivity section, we report that results are not 
sensitive to alternative construction heuristics of ARC such as counting all tags whether or not they 
repeat within a filing. 
Account Specific Complexity 
One important feature that differentiates ARC from other broad measures (e.g., the Fog Index) 
is that it is constructed based on specific accounting disclosures and, as such, it can be 
disaggregated to calculate the complexity of specific accounts. We use the FASB XBRL taxonomy 
to measure complexity of three specific accounts (fair value, derivatives, and pensions). 
Specifically, we use the calculation link and the presentation link files provided by FASB.18 These 
files classify XBRL tags into various account categories. We rely on both files to extract a list of 
tags that appear in each account category (fair value, derivatives, and pensions) and remove 
duplicates. Some of the tags in these lists repeat frequently across different accounting categories 
(e.g., EPS).19 We remove these tags because we cannot uniquely attribute them to a specific 
category.20 The three new complexity variables are termed ARC-FAIR, ARC-DERIV, and ARC-
PENS and capture the number of reported XBRL tags in each category. 
                                                 
18 A detailed description of the process to construct account specific complexity and a sample of fair value tags appears 
in Appendices A and B, respectively.  
19 To identify account categories we rely on “Disclosure” headings in the taxonomy files. Some tags appear in 
multiple financial statements and/or notes. We remove tags that repeat in more than three disclosures because we 
cannot uniquely associate them with a specific account category. The FASB files are available at: 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPage&cid=1176164649716 . 
20 Companies also use extended tags, which are not part of the XBRL taxonomy. In our sample, 17.4 percent of tags 
are extensions. We search for common terms that the taxonomy uses to describe tags in specific categories and classify 
extended tags to those account categories. For example, the word “fair” exists in 98% of the fair value tags in the 




Our research design centers on the analyses of two samples: firm-year and analyst-firm-year level. 
The first set of analyses examines our research question using firm-level attributes. The second set 
of analysis uses various analyst-specific attributes to shed light on moderators of the relation 
between complexity and forecast accuracy. 
Firm-year Level Sample: Dependent variables 
In the firm-year level analysis, we use six dependent variables to test our hypotheses. The first two 
dependent variables are used to test H1, labeled LOGFOLL_FOR and LOGFOLL_REC, measure 
analyst coverage. As defined in Table 1, LOGFOLL_FOR equals the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of analysts who issued annual earnings forecasts for the corresponding fiscal year and 
LOGFOLL_REC equals the number of analysts who issued stock recommendation revisions 
during the fiscal year. As additional analyses, we break down the analyst following measures based 
on brokerage size (i.e. large and small) and repeat our analyses. To capture analyst performance 
for testing H2 and H3, we use the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts (ACCURACY), 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts (FORDISP), the informativeness of their stock 
recommendation revisions (RECVAL) and analysts’ responsiveness to earnings announcements 
(RESP). We calculate ACCURACY as the absolute value of reported earnings minus the median 
earnings forecast for the fiscal year, scaled by price, and multiplied by minus one so that higher 
values represent higher forecast accuracy.21 We measure FORDISP by calculating the standard 
deviation of analysts’ annual earnings estimates, scaled by the share price as of the end of the fiscal 
year. Higher values of FORDISP indicate greater disagreement among analysts. We multiply both 
ACCURACY and FORDISP by 100 to avoid overly small OLS coefficient estimates.  
                                                 
21 Share price is measured as of the end of the fiscal period and adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. 
 21 
 
We measure RECVAL by first calculating the three-day market reaction associated with 
each revision. We then exclude revisions that analysts issued within two days following earnings 
announcements,22 those that reiterate previous recommendation ratings, and those that were issued 
on days with conflicting recommendation revisions (e.g., one analyst issues an upgrade and 
another issues a downgrade).23 We multiply the market reaction for downgrades by minus one to 
align the returns to upgrades and downgrades.24 RECVAL is equal to the mean three-day market 
reaction for all revisions issued during the fiscal year. To the extent that analysts uncover and/or 
process information that is useful to their clients, the market reaction associated with their revisions 
will be higher.25 Finally, we measure RESP by calculating the percentage of analysts who issued 
earnings forecasts for the next fiscal quarter within two-days (0, +1) of the current earnings 
announcement. To the extent that analysts find it more difficult to analyze information disclosed 
by companies with greater accounting complexity, we expect an inverse relation between ARC 
and the proportion of analysts issuing forecasts within two-days after earnings announcements.  
Firm-year Level Sample: Control variables 
We control for a number of factors that prior research shows to be associated with analyst 
coverage and performance. Prior studies find attributes of information environment to be strongly 
associated with analyst coverage and their performance (Bhushan 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan 
1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barth et al. 2001; Frankel et al. 2006; Lehavy et al. 2011). Firm 
size (LOGMV), institutional ownership (IO), growth potential (B/M and GROWTH), disclosure 
                                                 
22 We eliminate revisions after earnings announcements to ensure that confounding events do not affect our measure. 
23 We eliminate revisions issued on days with conflicting recommendation revisions because it is unclear which 
revision share prices are reacting to (or ignoring).  
24 The expected market reaction to an upgrade is positive whereas it is negative for a downgrade. Hence, while a 
more positive reaction to an upgrade indicates greater informativeness, it indicates less informativeness for a 
downgrade. Multiplying the returns associated with downgrades allows us to interpret the results for both upgrades 
and downgrades in the same way. 
25 We assume that markets are at a minimum semi-strong efficient. 
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informativeness (NEWS10K), analyst following (LOGFOLL_FOR), and forecast horizon 
(LOGHORIZON) are frequently used as proxies for the information environment as well as 
investors’ demand for information. We also control for analysts’ incentives to cover companies 
(TURN, ADV, RND, and ROA). Analysts’ and their employers’ incentives to provide research vary 
in relation to various firm-specific attributes. For example, brokerage firms consider companies 
with higher trading activity to be more lucrative for business because of the potential commission 
revenue that they can earn by covering them. In this respect, trading activity represents an incentive 
for analysts to cover companies and provide accurate earnings forecasts (Alford and Berger 1999; 
Barth et al. 2001). Finally, we control for firm complexity and information uncertainty by 
including a host of variables (FOROPS, LOGSGMT, EARNVOL, FOG10K, STDRET, and LOSS). 
Table 1 defines in detail the control variables that are used in the regression analyses. 
Analyst-firm-year Level Sample 
In the analyst-firm-year level sample, we focus on forecast accuracy as our performance 
measure. We do not examine forecast dispersion and proportion of responsive analysts because 
these measures can only be calculated at the firm-year level. Further, estimates of the 
informativeness of recommendations are unreliable at the analyst level because analysts issue only 
a few recommendations for each firm per year. We examine the association between analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and general experience (GEXP), which is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the individual worked as an analyst plus one, firm-specific experience (FEXP), which is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years the analyst covered the company plus one, and industry 
focus (INDFOCUS), which is the inverse of the numbers of industries the analyst covers. We also 
examine whether forecast accuracy, controlling for the firm-specific variables discussed before, is 
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associated with a number of account-specific complexity (ARC-FAIR, ARC-DERIV, and ARC-
PENS) and expertise (EXPRT-FAIR, EXPRT-DERIV, and EXPRT-PENS) measures. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the final sample. The first section in Table 
3 lists the five dependent variables used in the analyses. For ease of interpretation, we report 
statistics based on untransformed values for all variables. The mean (median) values of analysts 
following based on earnings estimates (FOLL_FOR) and recommendation revisions (FOLL_REC) 
are 16.393 (14) and 7.191 (6), respectively. The mean (median) ACCURACY is -0.606 (-0.144). 
The interquartile range is between -0.403 and -0.052.26 The mean and median ACCURACY values 
indicate a left skewed distribution. This is primarily because, as in prior research (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Mikhail et al. 1999; Duru and Reeb 2002; Hope 2003b; Dhaliwal et al. 2012), we 
compute the absolute value of forecast errors, which places the negative and positive values in the 
same quadrant. We winsorize all continuous variables (with the exception of log-transformed 
variables) at the bottom and top one-percentile to ensure that our results are not due to the influence 
of outliers. The mean (median) value for FORDISP is 1.034 (0.275). Similar to ACCURACY, 
FORDISP exhibits a skewed distribution (right-skewed). The mean (median) three-day (-1, +1) 
abnormal market reaction associated with revisions (RECVAL) is 3.041 (1.89) percent. Finally, the 
mean (median) RESP is 50.3 (53) percent which suggest that approximately 50% of analyst issue 
an earnings forecast within two-days after the earnings announcement. 
The next section in Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the four variables that we use 
to measure accounting reporting complexity. The mean (median) ARC, which is the overall tag 
                                                 
26 Note that the sign of the ACCURACY variable does not indicate the direction of the forecast error. We first 




count, equals 407.567 (379).27 The following three variables represent the tag counts based on 
account categories: pensions (ARC-PENS), fair values (ARC-FAIR), and derivatives (ARC-
DERIV). The mean (median) tag counts for the three categories are 24.866 (5), 12.649 (8), and 
8.252 (5), respectively. There is significant variation within the account specific complexity 
measures. For instance, the first and third quartile values for ARC-PENS equal 1 and 48.  
The final section in Table 3 Panel A, reports statistics on the control variables used in our 
analyses. The mean and median market values of firms in our sample are $9.9B and $2.2B and 
have an average institutional ownership level of 69.2 percent. These statistics indicate that the final 
sample generally consists of large companies that have a strong institutional presence. Since our 
focus is on understanding the relation between accounting complexity and analysts’ behavior, we 
require data on analysts’ outputs and therefore our sample, by design, consists of larger companies. 
Table 3 Panel B presents descriptive statistics on the analyst-firm-year level sample. The average 
analyst in our sample has 9.4 years of general and 4.6 years of firm-specific experience and covers 
an average of 1.72 industries.28 To help interpret the coefficient on the industry variable, we divide 
one by the number of industries and use this as a measure of the analyst’s industry focus (0.580).29 
Further, the raw values of our fair value, derivatives and pensions expertise measures equal 
211.226, 171.775, and 381.197, respectively. These values represent the mean number of tags 
reported by companies in analysts’ portfolio of coverage in each of these three accounts.30 Finally, 
the average (median) forecast age for our sample is 108.948 (97) days. 
                                                 
27Although the natural logarithm of some variables is used in our models, we discuss statistics based on their raw 
values. 
28 INDFOCUS equals one divided by the number of industries covered. Since the mean value for INDFOCUS is 0.579 
we infer that the average analyst covers 1/0.58 = 1.72 industries. 
29 This transformation reverses the variable’s order so that higher (lower) values indicate greater (lower) industry 
focus. 
30 For example, if an analyst covers four firms, we sum all the fair-value tags covered by that analyst across all four 
firms. The mean values are the averages in our sample.  
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Table 4 Panel A presents the Pearson correlations among the accounting reporting 
complexity measures and the dependent variables. As expected, the estimated correlation between 
our two analyst coverage variables based on forecasts (LOGFOLL_FOR) and recommendation 
revisions (LOGFOLL_REC) is high (0.86) and statistically significant. The strong correlation is 
consistent with prior research and indicates that most analysts who issue recommendations also 
provide earnings forecasts for the same company. Other correlation estimates between the 
dependent variables, with the exception of FORDISP and ACCURACY (-0.63), are smaller than 
0.25 in magnitude. The estimated correlation between FORDISP and ACCURACY indicates that 
there is generally greater disagreement among analysts when earnings estimates are less accurate. 
The two variables, however, do not overlap entirely. Therefore, we study both variables with the 
aim of providing a comprehensive analysis of the relation between complexity and forecast 
performance. 
The correlation estimates between accounting reporting complexity measures (e.g., ARC) 
and analyst following (LOGFOLL_FOR, LOGFOLL_REC) reported in Table 4 are all positive and 
statistically significant. In contrast, the estimated correlations between accounting reporting 
complexity and measures of forecast accuracy (ACCURACY) and forecast dispersion (FORDISP) 
are weaker. We also observe a negative correlation between the value of recommendation revisions 
and accounting reporting complexity measures suggesting that when complexity rises the value of 
recommendations declines. Finally, we observe a negative correlation between analysts’ 
responsiveness and complexity. This suggests that as accounting complexity increases analysts 
find it harder to promptly issue forecasts after earnings announcements. However, we note that the 
correlation estimates in Table 4 do not control for factors that may influence analyst following and 
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performance. We therefore base our inferences on the regression analyses, which control for 
confounding factors. 
Examining the correlation estimates between the four accounting reporting complexity 
variables reported in Table 4, we observe that the correlations between overall ARC and the other 
three complexity variables (e.g., ARC-PENS, ARC-FAIR) are generally high. The high 
correlations, however, are by design. ARC represents an aggregation of the other complexity 
variables. Finally, the correlations between the complexity measures based on the three account 
categories (i.e. pensions, fair-values, and derivatives) are lower and range between 0.26 and 0.52. 
The relatively low correlations indicate that while the account-specific complexity variables are 
associated with overall ARC, they measure more refined and less correlated aspects of accounting 
complexity. 
Table 4 Panel B presents the correlation matrix for the variables in the analyst-firm-year 
sample that are incremental to the ones in the firm-year sample. We find that the general and firm-
specific experience measures correlate positively with our expertise measures. The positive 
associations imply that analysts with more experience tend to develop greater expertise in areas 
that are considered to be more complex. Finally, the correlation coefficients among the two 
experience measures and the three expertise measures are generally high.31 We, therefore, avoid 
including these variables simultaneously in the regression models. In addition, we mean center the 
experience, industry focus, and expertise measures to avoid multicollinearity from biasing the 
estimation results. 
V. Empirical Results 
                                                 
31 The two experience measures are GEXP and FEXP. The three expertise measures are EXPRT-FAIR, EXPRT-
DERIV, and EXPRT-PENS. INDFOCUS measures industry focus. The correlation between INDFOCUS and other 
variables is not high. 
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Accounting complexity and analyst coverage 
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis examining the relation between accounting 
complexity and analyst coverage. The first model in Table 5 reports the results based on 
LOGFOLL_FOR. The coefficient on ARC is estimated to be -0.128 (p<0.01) and indicates that a 
ten percent increase in accounting complexity is associated with an approximately 1.3 percent 
reduction in analyst coverage. In the following two models, we separately re-estimate the analyst 
following model for large and small brokerage houses. The ARC coefficient estimates are -0.084 
(p<0.05) and -0.174 (p<0.01) for large and small brokerage houses, respectively. The coefficient 
on ARC, estimated based on a sample of large brokerage houses, is significantly smaller than the 
coefficient on ARC based on a sample of small brokerage houses (p<0.05). These results suggest 
that ARC serves as a stronger deterrent for small brokerage houses than it does for larger ones. The 
last three columns in Table 5 show consistent results when we measure analyst following based 
on recommendations.  
Collectively, the estimation results reveal a negative association between analyst coverage 
and accounting complexity. These results are consistent with financial analysts being less inclined 
to cover companies with higher accounting complexity. The inverse effect appears to be more 
pronounced for smaller brokerage houses, which presumably have limited resources to deal with 
accounting reporting complexity and are more likely to selectively cover firms. Finally, similar to 
Lehavy et al.’s (2011) findings, our results show that FOG10K is associated with greater analyst 
coverage. 
Accounting complexity and analysts’ performance 
Table 6 presents the regression analysis results for testing H2 using four dependent 
variables: ACCURACY, FORDISP, RECVAL, and RESP. In the column labeled “ACCURACY”, 
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we find that the coefficient on ARC is estimated to be -0.438 (p<0.01). ARC’s coefficient indicates 
that a single standard deviation increase in ARC is associated with a 0.16 decline in analysts’ 
forecast accuracy (ACCURACY). Placing this association in perspective, note that the interquartile 
range of ACCURACY is 0.351. In other words, a single standard-deviation change in ARC is 
associated with nearly half an interquartile range difference in ACCURACY. In short, the 
estimation results point to an economically meaningful and statistically significant inverse relation 
between accounting complexity and analysts’ performance. These results are consistent with 
accounting complexity representing a significant challenge for financial analysts.  
Next, we study the relation between ARC and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. In 
the second column of Table 6, labeled “FORDISP”, the estimated coefficient on ARC equals 0.514 
(p<0.01) and indicates a 0.189 increase in forecast dispersion per one standard deviation increase 
in ARC. This increase corresponds to more than a quarter of the interquartile range for forecast 
dispersion (FORDISP). Similar to our inferences from the first model, we find that as accounting 
complexity increases, analysts’ earnings estimates are adversely affected. The two models together 
provide support for H2a and indicate that analysts’ forecasts are less accurate and more dispersed 
for firms with higher ARC. Higher dispersion along with lower accuracy undoubtedly makes it 
more challenging for investors to use analysts’ research in their investment decisions.  
We next turn to an analysis of the informativeness of stock recommendation revisions to 
test whether accounting complexity favorably or adversely affects analysts’ ability to identify 
mispriced securities. In Table 6, the column labeled “RECVAL” reports the estimation results of 
our empirical model with the value of stock recommendation revisions serving as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient on ARC in this model represents the association between accounting 
complexity and the informativeness of analysts' revisions. We find a negative and significant 
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association between ARC and RECVAL (p< 0.01). The -0.829 ARC coefficient suggests a 31 basis 
point decrease in the market reaction to revisions, per one standard deviation increase in ARC. 
Given that the mean RECVAL is 3.04 percent, this corresponds to nearly a ten-percent decrease in 
the value of revisions per standard deviation increase in ARC. This result supports H2b and 
suggests that analysts have difficulty producing informative research for companies with greater 
ARC. A priori, ARC presents a challenge for ordinary investors which may yield a comparative 
advantage to financial analysts in identifying mispriced securities. However, in contradiction to 
this notion, we find that ARC adversely affects the value of analysts’ recommendation revisions. 
Finally, we study the relation between ARC and analysts’ responsiveness to earnings 
announcement. In the last column of Table 6, labeled “RESP”, the coefficient on ARC is estimated 
to be -0.09 (p<0.01) and indicates a 3.31 percentage point decrease in analysts’ responsiveness per 
one standard deviation increase in ARC. Given that the average analyst responsiveness is 50.3 
percent, a 3.31 percentage point change corresponds to nearly a 6.6 percent decrease in analyst 
responsiveness which is economically meaningful. This result provides support for H2c. Overall, 
the results in Table 6 suggest an inverse relation between ARC and forecast accuracy, the 
informativeness of recommendations, and responsiveness and a positive relation between ARC and 
forecast dispersion.  
Analyst experience and industry focus 
 The findings reported in Table 6 show that ARC is inversely associated with analysts’ 
performance, which is consistent with the conclusion that complexity adversely affects analysts’ 
performance. We next explore whether analyst experience and industry focus mitigate some of the 
adverse effects of complexity. In order to examine variation across analysts in terms of experience 
and industry focus, we estimate analyst-firm-year level models and focus on forecast accuracy. 
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 Table 7 presents three models that include general experience (GEXP), firm-specific 
experience (FEXP), and industry focus (INDFOCUS) measures and their interactions with ARC. 
In line with our findings from the firm-year level analysis, we find that ARC is inversely associated 
with forecast accuracy. The coefficient on GEXP is positive, suggesting that forecast accuracy 
increases with general experience. More importantly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction 
variable, ARC X GEXP, is positive and statistically significant (p< 0.01). The positive coefficient 
on the interaction variable implies that experience helps attenuate the negative effect of 
complexity. In Model 2, we find that the firm-specific experience (FEXP) measure is not 
statistically significant. Similar to Model 1, however, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
ARC X FEXP is positive and statistically significant (p< 0.01). Overall, experience appears to be 
helpful to analysts as they deal with accounting reporting complexity. Finally, in Model 3, we 
examine the relation between analysts’ industry focus and their forecast accuracy. We find that the 
coefficient on the interaction variable, ARC X INDFOCUS, is positive and statistically significant 
(p< 0.01); this implies that analysts who concentrate on fewer industries (i.e. covering fewer 
industries) perform better, in particular, for firms with more accounting reporting complexity. 
Overall these results provide support for H3. 
Account specific analyst expertise 
 We next examine whether expertise in certain topics (i.e., fair value, derivatives, and 
pensions) helps analysts forecast earnings for companies that are more complex in those respects. 
The first three models in Panel A of Table 8 present the estimation results of the analysis with 
account-specific complexity and expertise measures along with their interactions. In model 1, we 
find that the coefficient on ARC-FAIR is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). Our fair-
value expertise measure (EXPRT-FAIR) is also estimated to be statistically significant (p<0.01) 
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and suggests that analysts who have greater expertise in covering companies that report more fair-
value XBRL tags perform better overall in forecasting earnings. Most importantly, we find that 
the coefficient on the interaction variable, ARC-FAIR X EXPRT-FAIR is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01). The positive ARC-FAIR X EXPRT-FAIR suggests that analysts with fair-
value expertise issue earnings estimates that are more accurate, particularly for companies that 
have complex fair-value reporting. The results reported in Model 2 concerning derivatives echo 
our findings from Model 1 for fair value. Overall, we find that expertise in derivatives helps 
analysts estimate earnings of companies that have more complex derivative reporting. In Model 3, 
we fail to find a statistically significant negative association between pension-specific complexity 
and forecast accuracy. However, the coefficient on EXPRT-PENS implies that analysts with 
expertise in pensions issue more accurate earnings estimates overall. We do not find an interaction 
effect that implies a more pronounced positive effect of analysts’ pension expertise for firms that 
are complex in the pensions reporting area. 
To ensure that our finding that account-specific expertise attenuates adverse performance 
consequences is not a manifestation of omitted measures of experience, in Panel B of Table 8 we 
include the general experience (GEXP) measure in the fair value, derivatives, and pension 
expertise models. This comparison is important because while research finds that GEXP is 
associated with analyst performance, it is infeasible to disaggregate this general experience into 
specific account categories. We find that the coefficients on our primary variables of interest 
(EXPRT-FAIR, EXPRT-DERIV, and EXPRT-PENS) and their interactions with account-specific 
complexity measures (ARC-FAIR, ARC-DERIV, and ARC-PENS) remain unchanged. Further, we 
find that the coefficients on general experience (GEXP), in models 4-6, are positively associated 
with forecast accuracy. However, the coefficients on the interaction of GEXP with account-
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specific measures are not statistically significant in any of the models. These results suggest that 
while general experience has an overall positive effect on forecast accuracy, experience does not 
appear to be associated with an incremental benefit for firms that are complex in their fair-value, 
derivatives, or pensions reporting. Overall, results in this section provide support for H4. 
Sensitivity analyses 
Component of ARC that is orthogonal to size and operating complexity 
ARC may encompass complexity that is due to operating and linguistic complexity. 
Therefore, our results may be driven by operating complexity rather than accounting reporting 
complexity. To partially alleviate this concern, we regress ARC on firm size, business segments, 
and foreign operations and include industry and year controls. The model is well specified with an 
adjusted R-square of 42%. Next, we substitute the residual from this model for ARC and find 
similar results. This suggests that ARC captures complexity that goes beyond firm size and 
operating complexity.  
Alternative measurement of ARC 
We conduct a number of robustness checks, aimed at examining whether our results are 
sensitive to alternative methodological choices. First, we split ARC into two categories: one based 
on taxonomy tags and another based on extensions (custom-made tags by companies). We find 
that our H1 results for analyst coverage are largely driven by the taxonomy counts, whereas in the 
H2 performance analyses we find a more balanced effect. Responsiveness is negatively associated 
with ARC based on both taxonomy and extension counts. Forecast accuracy is inversely associated 
with the extension based complexity measure while forecast dispersion and value of 
recommendations are associated with the taxonomy based complexity measure. Second, we repeat 
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our analysis using the unique number of tags (recall that the ARC variable allows tags to repeat but 
not in the same financial statement or note table) and find similar results. Further, using the number 
of facts reported by companies (i.e., we do not remove any reported fact) also yields similar results. 
Third, we adopt a different approach for classifying XBRL tags into account-specific categories. 
We search for a list of keywords and their stems that we identify from the taxonomy. For example, 
to search for derivatives, we use keywords such as derivative, hedge, hedging, and instrument. The 
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to categorize more tags. We manually verify this 
classification and noticed that although it is correct, it is subject to cross-membership in multiple 
accounts. Specifically, some tags are counted twice or more, for example, a particular tag can be 
classified as fair value, derivatives, and pension tag. We combine this classification with our initial, 
more conservative, classification that we used in our tables. Although this approach increases the 
tag counts in each category, results remain unchanged. 
Controlling for financial reporting quality and for sample bias 
ARC is associated with poor financial reporting quality (Hoitash and Hoitash 2017). It is, 
therefore, possible that analyst performance suffers from poor financial reporting quality rather 
than accounting complexity. To alleviate this concern, we control for financial reporting quality 
measures including misstatements, material weakness, discretionary accruals, and audit delay and 
find similar results.32 Finally, we exclude data from the fiscal year 2011 because of the relatively 
low number of observations we have for that year as a result of the phased-in adoption. We reach 
identical inferences from all our analyses based on a sample of 2012-2014. 
VI. Conclusions 
                                                 
32 As an alternative sensitivity analysis, we exclude observations in which the company reported a material weakness 
or restatement. Our findings based on this sub-sample are identical to those derived from the full sample.  
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Accounting reporting complexity leads to greater costs for preparers, requires more time to audit, 
and complicates regulatory efforts (SEC 2008). In addition, accounting complexity often increases 
the amount of time and effort that users of financial information need to invest to understand the 
company’s financial position and performance (SEC 2008). Consistently, the FASB (2010) states 
that “At times, even well-informed and diligent users may need to seek the aid of an adviser to 
understand information about complex economic phenomena [Emphasis added].” This raises the 
question of whether advisers (e.g., financial analysts) can decipher accounting disclosures, 
interpret information, and provide informative guidance in cases where there is higher accounting 
reporting complexity. In order to shed light on how accounting reporting complexity influences 
the activities of advisers, this study examines variation in analysts’ coverage decisions and 
performance in relation to accounting reporting complexity. 
We measure accounting reporting complexity based on the amount of accounting 
information in XBRL filings. First, we find that analysts shy away from coverage of companies 
with higher accounting reporting complexity and that this association is stronger among smaller 
brokerage firms. The inverse relation is at odds with the notion that analysts choose to cover 
complex firms to enjoy greater opportunities for profitable investment recommendations and 
higher trading commissions. Second, we find that accounting reporting complexity has an adverse 
effect on analysts’ performance. Specifically, we find that for companies with higher accounting 
reporting complexity, analysts are less responsive following earnings announcements, and that the 
accuracy and informativeness of their forecasts and recommendations are significantly lower. In 
addition, we find greater dispersion among analysts when accounting complexity is high. The 
increased disagreement among analysts presumably makes it more challenging for investors to 
rely on analysts’ advice.  
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We recognize that these adverse performance consequences are important to overcome and 
examine possible solutions to mitigate the negative association between accounting complexity 
and analyst performance. We find that analysts with greater general experience, firm-specific 
experience, industry focus, and account-specific expertise are able to alleviate the negative effects 
of accounting complexity. These solutions are relevant to both analysts and those who rely on and 
monitor analysts. Our research produces insights that are relevant to regulators and standard-setters 
concerned with developing a better understanding of, and solutions for the capital market 
consequences of accounting complexity. Further, the findings in this study may be of interest to 
investors and creditors who rely on analyst reports to make decisions.  
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Appendix A- Description of account-specific complexity 
To identify tags in specific accounts we refer to the U.S. GAAP taxonomy which is 
available on the FASB’s website. In the taxonomy, tags are divided into categories of accounts. 
For instance, derivative and hedging tags appear under the heading "Disclosure - Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities" and fair value tags appear under the heading “- Disclosure - 
Fair Value Measures and Disclosures”. We identify all tag names under each relevant heading and 
associated such tags with their specific account category. For example, to identify fair value tags, 
we refer to the Calculation Tab in the taxonomy file and identify 138 tags under the fair value 
heading. These tags are presented in Appendix B. We augment this list of tags with tags that appear 
under the Presentation Tab. We use this list of tags as the basis for identifying fair value tags.  
Next, we identify tags that appear in multiple categories. Because we cannot uniquely 
attribute tags that appear in three or more account categories to any specific category we drop such 
tags from our list of fair value tags. For example, the tags “shareprice” appears under the fair value 
category but also in several other categories and therefore it is not classified as a fair value tag. 
Next, because this list of tags applies only to taxonomy tags and not to extended tags, we follow 
the following process to identify extended tags. To do so, we first look for keywords that frequently 
appear in the tag names. For example, the word “Fair” appears in 98 percent of fair value tags. 
Therefore, we search all extended tags and classify them as fair value tags if they include the word 




Appendix B- A sample of Fair value tags from the Calculation Link in the FASB XBRL Taxonomy 
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Table 1 - Variable definitions 
This table lists all the variables (in italics) used in the analyses and provides detailed descriptions on how 
we computed each variable. The table consists of three sections: dependent variables, variables of interest, 
and control variables. The data source(s) for each variable is reported in parentheses at the end of each 
definition. 
Variable Name  Description 
Dependent variables 
LOGFOLL_FOR : The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts who issued earnings 
forecasts for the current fiscal year (I/B/E/S). 
LOGFOLL_REC : The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts who issued stock 
recommendation revisions during the current fiscal year (I/B/E/S). 
ACCURACY : Absolute value of reported earnings minus the median earnings forecast for the 
fiscal year scaled by price and multiplied by minus one (I/B/ES and Compustat).  
FORDISP : The standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings estimates divided by the end 
of fiscal year share price (I/B/E/S and Compustat). 
RECVAL : The mean three-day abnormal market reaction associated with recommendation 
revisions issued during the current fiscal year. We exclude the following: (1) 
revisions issued within two days after earnings announcements, (2) reiterations 
(i.e., recommendations that reiterate previous recommendation ratings), and (3) 
revisions issued on days when analysts issued conflicting recommendation 
revisions (e.g., one analyst issued an upgrade while another issued a downgrade). 
Finally, before calculating firm-year level values, we multiply the market reaction 
for downgrades with minus one to align the returns to downgrades with upgrades 
(I/B/E/S and CRSP). 
RESP  The percentage of analysts who issued earnings forecasts for the next fiscal quarter 
within two-days (0, +1) of the current earnings announcement date. 
Variables of interest 
ARC : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags reported in 
Item 8 of 10-K filings, which includes the financial statements and notes 
(Calcbench). 
ARC-FS : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags reported in the 
face of the financial statements (Calcbench). 
ARC-NOTES : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags reported in the 
footnotes of the financial statements (Calcbench). 
ARC-FAIR : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags related to fair 
value accounts reported in the financial statements and notes (Calcbench). 
ARC-DERIV : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags related to 




ARC-PENS : The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of numeric tags related to 
pension accounts reported in the financial statements and notes (Calcbench). 
GEXP : The number of years since the analyst first appeared in the I/B/E/S database. We 
reset the variable to one when there is a period longer than two years where the 
analyst did not issue any earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S).  
FEXP : The number of years since the analyst began issuing forecasts for the company. 
We reset the variable to one when there is a period longer than two years where 
the analyst did not issue any earnings forecasts for the company (I/B/E/S). 
INDFOCUS : One divided by the number of industries represented in the analyst’s portfolio of 
coverage. We use the industry definitions outlined in the 12-industry scheme in 
Fama and French (1997) (Compustat).  
EXPRT-FAIR : The total number of fair value related tags reported by the companies in the 
analyst’s portfolio of coverage (Calcbench and I/B/E/S). 
EXPRT-DERIV : The total number of derivative related tags reported by the companies in the 
analyst’s portfolio of coverage (Calcbench and I/B/E/S). 
EXPRT-PENS : The total number of pension related tags reported by the companies in the analyst’s 
portfolio of coverage (Calcbench and I/B/E/S). 
Control variables 
LOGMV : The natural logarithm of one plus the market value computed as of the end of the 
fiscal year (Compustat). 
IO : Percentage of shares held by institutional investors (CRSP and Thomson 
Financial). 
B/M : The ratio of the book and market values of equity as of the end of the fiscal year 
(Compustat). 
GROWTH : The one-year change in sales (Compustat). 
NEWS10K : The absolute value of the two-day market reaction associated with the company’s 
current 10-K filing (EDGAR Online and CRSP). 
LOGHORIZON : The natural logarithm of median forecast horizon, where forecast horizon equals 
the earnings announcement date minus the forecast date (I/B/E/S). 
TURN : The ratio of the number of shares traded during the fiscal year and the total number 
of shares outstanding (Compustat). 
ADV : Advertising expenditure divided by total operating expense (Compustat). 
RND : Research and development expenditure divided by total operating expense 
(Compustat). 
ROA : Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets (Compustat). 
FOROPS : Equals one for companies that have non-missing foreign exchange income and 
zero otherwise (Compustat). 
LOGSGMT : The natural logarithm of one plus the number of business segments (Compustat). 
EARNVOL : The standard deviation of annual diluted earnings per share (excluding 
extraordinary items) figures reported during the last ten years. A minimum of 
three years of earnings per share data is required (Compustat). 
FOG10K : The Fog Index value (Gunning 1952) of the current fiscal year’s 10-K filing 
(EDGAR Online). 
STDRET : The standard deviation of daily stock returns during the fiscal year (CRSP). 
LOSS : Equals one for companies that report negative income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat). 
FORAGE : The natural logarithm of one plus the number of days that elapsed from the 





Table 2 - Sample derivation and composition 
This table reports the sample derivation (Panel A) and the number of observations in the final 
sample by year (Panel B). 
 
Panel A: Sample derivation  
Steps Obs. 
Firm-year level sample  
Sample of 2011-2014 fiscal year companies that meet the following 
conditions: 
- XBRL filings submitted within 150 days of the fiscal year end,  
- At least ten taxonomy tags in each of the financial statements (i.e. 
income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash-flows) and the 
notes. 
12,926 
Merge with the Compustat Annual File (comp.funda) based on CIK code. 12,063 
Retain companies with positive sales (Compustat data item: sale), non-missing 
common shares outstanding (csho) and total assets (at) greater than $10 
million. 
12,062 
Require a minimum of two consecutive years of XBRL filings. Note: We 
implement this filter because firms must tag the financial statement notes only 
in the second XBRL filing. 
11,377 
Eliminate firms without the necessary accounting data and without analyst 
coverage (based on both earnings forecasts and stock recommendations). 
Specifically, we require that each firm-year has at least three earnings forecasts 
and one stock recommendation revision (excluding recommendation revisions 
issued immediately after earnings announcements). Note: We require at a 




Analyst-firm-year level sample  
Obtain annual earnings estimates issued by analysts covering the companies in 
the firm-year level sample. Retain the last estimate issued by each analyst who 
has a non-anonymous I/B/E/S analyst and brokerage code (i.e., analys and 
estimator variables not equal to “000000”).  
112,950 
 
Panel B: Observations per year 




2011 900 19,576 
2012 1,732 29,735 
2013 1,839 32,601 
2014 1,761 31,038 




Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
The table below reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The sample 
consists of 6,247 observations that represent the fiscal years 2011-2014. Table 1 defines all 
variables. All continuous variables, with the exception of the log-transformed ones, are winsorized 
at the bottom and top one-percentile. For ease of interpretation, we report descriptive statistics on 
the raw values of the starred (*) variables but use their log-transformations in the regression 
analysis. All variables presented in Panel B, with the exception of FORAGE, are mean centered 
before being included in the regression analysis. 
 
Panel A: Firm-year level sample 
      




Dependent variables:      
FOLL_FOR* 16.393 14.000 10.597 8.000 23.000 
FOLL_REC* 7.199 6.000 5.092 3.000 10.000 
ACCURACY -0.606 -0.144 1.886 -0.403 -0.052 
FORDISP 1.034 0.275 2.603 0.109 0.777 
RECVAL 3.041 1.888 5.067 0.494 4.162 
RESP 0.503 0.529 0.223 0.347 0.667 
Variables of interest:      
ARC* 407.567 379.000 159.148 296.000 487.000 
ARC-PENS* 24.866 5.000 28.407 1.000 48.000 
ARC-FAIR* 12.649 8.000 16.055 4.000 15.000 
ARC-DERIV* 8.252 5.000 10.420 1.000 12.000 
      
Control variables:      
MV* 9941.328 2220.636 29510.629 756.904 6889.813 
IO 69.186 72.753 20.118 59.025 83.337 
B/M 0.501 0.423 0.423 0.241 0.685 
GROWTH 0.105 0.060 0.306 -0.008 0.150 
NEWS10K 0.024 0.013 0.032 0.006 0.028 
HORIZON 94.856 97.000 35.480 88.000 111.000 
TURN 242.658 196.959 170.704 129.198 303.357 
ADV 0.015 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.015 
RND 0.061 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.051 
ROA 0.022 0.039 0.136 0.008 0.078 
FOROPS 0.392 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 
SEGMENT* 2.741 2.000 1.992 1.000 4.000 
EARNVOL 2.633 0.880 8.928 0.463 1.747 
FOG10K 19.238 19.208 1.053 18.519 19.939 
STDRET 2.184 1.968 0.993 1.470 2.658 
LOSS 0.189 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.000 
N 6,232     
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Panel B: Analyst-firm-year level sample 
      
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
GEXP* 9.402 8.000 6.512 4.000 13.000 
FEXP* 4.606 3.000 3.777 2.000 6.000 
INDFOCUS 0.580 0.500 0.326 0.333 1.000 
EXPRT-FAIR* 211.226 120.000 284.100 72.000 202.000 
EXPRT-DERIV* 171.775 108.000 184.770 59.000 204.000 
EXPRT-PENS* 381.197 262.000 389.044 97.000 540.000 
FORAGE* 108.948 97.000 84.888 48.000 118.000 




Table 4 - Correlation Table 
The table below reports the estimates of Pearson correlations among the dependent variables and accounting reporting complexity 
measures. The symbols * and ** indicate statistical significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm-year level sample 
 
            
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
LOGFOLL_FOR 1 1.00          
LOGFOLL_REC 2 0.86** 1.00         
ACCURACY 3 0.16** 0.10** 1.00        
FORDISP 4 -0.14** -0.08** -0.63** 1.00       
RECVAL 5 -0.24** -0.18** -0.12** 0.18** 1.00      
RESP 6 0.08** 0.04** 0.14** -0.17** 0.09** 1.00     
ARC 7 0.20** 0.17** 0.01 -0.03* -0.22** -0.18** 1.00    
ARC-PENS 8 0.15** 0.11** 0.10** -0.13** -0.22** -0.12** 0.59** 1.00   
ARC-FAIR 9 0.16** 0.13** 0.03* -0.02 -0.11** -0.10** 0.66** 0.26** 1.00  
ARC-DERIV 10 0.28** 0.25** 0.04** -0.06** -0.21** -0.16** 0.67** 0.44** 0.52** 1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Analyst-firm-year level sample 
         
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
GEXP 1 1.00       
FEXP 2 0.60 1.00      
INDFOCUS 3 -0.06 -0.02 1.00     
EXPRT-FAIR 4 0.24 0.15 0.12 1.00    
EXPRT-DERIV 5 0.21 0.14 -0.02 0.85 1.00   
EXPRT-PENS 6 0.23 0.19 -0.18 0.61 0.71 1.00  





Table 5 - Accounting complexity and analyst coverage (H1) 
The table below presents the results of the regression analysis (OLS) of analyst coverage based on forecasts and recommendation 
revisions. Table 1 defines all the variables used below. The t-statistics are in parenthesis, next to the coefficient estimates, and are 
computed based on standard errors clustered by firm. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively. Industry and year fixed-effects are included in both models. The number of observations and goodness 
of fit statistics are reported at the bottom of the table.  
 
 Analyst following based on forecasts (LOGFOLL_FOR) Analyst following based on recommendations (LOGFOLL_REC) 













ARC -0.128*** (-4.45) -0.084** (-2.30) -0.174*** (-4.99) -0.111*** (-4.09) -0.078** (-2.51) -0.139*** (-4.03) 
Information environment: 
LOGMV 0.293*** (47.84) 0.343*** (41.78) 0.200*** (25.77) 0.253*** (41.82) 0.279*** (38.47) 0.169*** (21.84) 
IO 0.001** (2.14) 0.002*** (3.73) -0.000 (-0.84) -0.000 (-0.77) 0.001** (2.34) -0.002*** (-3.97) 
B/M 0.089*** (4.43) 0.085*** (3.36) 0.116*** (4.69) 0.071*** (3.57) 0.069*** (3.13) 0.082*** (3.33) 
GROWTH -0.049** (-2.49) -0.098*** (-3.86) 0.015 (0.67) -0.028 (-1.53) -0.061*** (-2.84) -0.003 (-0.12) 
NEWS10K -0.028 (-0.16) -0.204 (-0.85) 0.071 (0.33) -0.023 (-0.12) -0.076 (-0.31) -0.078 (-0.33) 
Incentive to cover: 
TURN 0.001*** (20.21) 0.001*** (14.94) 0.001*** (16.94) 0.001*** (21.95) 0.001*** (16.94) 0.001*** (16.48) 
ADV 0.512** (2.49) 0.683** (2.33) 0.256 (0.97) 0.391* (1.88) 0.373 (1.48) 0.263 (0.90) 
RND -0.044 (-0.58) -0.212** (-2.17) 0.185* (1.93) -0.057 (-0.74) -0.238*** (-2.74) 0.163 (1.59) 
ROA -0.409*** (-6.40) -0.448*** (-4.85) -0.260*** (-3.20) -0.167** (-2.48) -0.270*** (-3.25) -0.021 (-0.26) 
Complexity: 
FOROPS -0.014 (-0.95) -0.049** (-2.55) 0.038** (1.97) 0.014 (0.87) -0.016 (-0.90) 0.044** (2.19) 
LOGSGMT -0.038*** (-3.13) -0.038** (-2.50) -0.046*** (-2.99) -0.035*** (-2.89) -0.023 (-1.63) -0.048*** (-3.12) 
EARNVOL -0.002*** (-3.28) -0.003*** (-3.29) -0.001 (-0.59) -0.001 (-1.49) -0.002** (-2.37) -0.000 (-0.08) 
FOG10K 0.018*** (2.70) 0.017* (1.94) 0.015* (1.75) 0.018*** (2.70) 0.022*** (2.97) 0.006 (0.76) 
Uncertainty: 
STDRET -0.049*** (-4.32) -0.053*** (-3.30) -0.047*** (-3.60) 0.002 (0.19) -0.001 (-0.04) 0.005 (0.38) 
LOSS 0.048** (2.32) 0.059** (2.18) 0.032 (1.29) 0.052** (2.50) 0.041 (1.64) 0.040 (1.50) 
Intercept 0.409** (1.98) -0.760*** (-2.92) 0.692*** (2.80) -0.159 (-0.78) -1.194*** (-5.26) 0.350 (1.40) 
Ind. & Yr. Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 6,232  6,232  6,232  6,232  6,232  6,232  
R-square 0.691  0.651  0.451  0.588  0.541  0.333  




Table 6 - Accounting complexity and forecast accuracy & dispersion and value of recommendation revisions (H2) 
The table below presents the results of the regression analysis (OLS) of analysts’ performance using forecast accuracy (ACCURACY), 
forecast dispersion (FORDISP), the value of recommendation revisions (RECVAL) and responsiveness (RESP). Table 1 defines all the 
variables used below. The t-statistics are in parenthesis, next to the coefficient estimates, and are computed based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively, with 
probability levels one-tailed for hypothesized directional expectations. Industry and year fixed-effects are included in both models. The 
number of observations and goodness of fit statistics are reported at the bottom of the table.  
 ACCURACY FORDISP RECVAL RESP 
Accounting complexity:         
ARC -0.438*** (-3.43) 0.514*** (3.36) -0.829*** (-3.94) -0.090*** (-6.94) 
Information environment:         
LOGMV 0.035 (1.12) -0.120*** (-2.78) -0.158** (-2.03) 0.005 (1.25) 
IO 0.005*** (3.07) -0.012*** (-5.79) 0.001 (0.14) 0.002*** (8.55) 
B/M -0.222 (-1.40) 0.874*** (4.15) 0.032 (0.15) -0.040*** (-4.25) 
GROWTH 0.172 (1.22) -0.247 (-1.27) -1.044*** (-3.09) -0.032*** (-3.24) 
NEWS10K -4.285*** (-3.08) 4.579** (2.56) -4.074 (-1.63) -0.178* (-1.67) 
LOGFOLL_FOR 0.102 (1.38) 0.280*** (2.92) -0.556*** (-3.25) -0.005 (-0.49) 
LOGHORIZON -0.115** (-2.20) 0.172*** (2.59) 0.016 (0.14) -0.020*** (-2.73) 
Incentive to cover:         
TURN -0.000 (-0.76) 0.001 (1.46) -0.002*** (-2.60) 0.000 (1.41) 
ADV -1.147 (-1.26) 0.883 (0.89) 7.740*** (3.69) 0.635*** (5.91) 
RND 1.666*** (4.93) -1.548*** (-3.37) 1.669** (2.04) 0.245*** (7.58) 
ROA 1.512*** (2.88) -3.159*** (-3.91) -1.369 (-1.27) 0.212*** (6.21) 
Complexity:         
FOROPS 0.092* (1.84) -0.067 (-1.04) -0.056 (-0.44) 0.035*** (4.37) 
LOGSGMT -0.025 (-0.69) 0.056 (1.24) 0.005 (0.06) -0.012** (-2.00) 
EARNVOL 0.003 (0.95) 0.013** (2.33) 0.001 (0.13) -0.001** (-2.37) 
FOG10K -0.014 (-0.73) -0.020 (-0.75) 0.102** (2.07) -0.001 (-0.19) 
Uncertainty:         
STDRET -0.393*** (-4.84) 0.742*** (7.35) 1.791*** (10.09) 0.001 (0.11) 
LOSS -0.720*** (-5.76) 0.951*** (6.00) 0.241 (0.86) 0.018 (1.63) 
Intercept 3.051*** (2.94) -3.790*** (-3.07) 5.479*** (3.34) 0.965*** (9.08) 
Ind. & Yr. Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 6,232  6,232  6,232  6,232  
R-square 0.193  0.353  0.219  0.132  
Adj. R-square 0.190  0.351  0.216  0.129  
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Table 7 - Analysts’ performance and the interaction between accounting complexity, 
experience and industry focus (H3) 
The table below presents the results of the regression analysis (OLS) of analysts’ forecast accuracy 
at the forecast level. Table 1 defines all the variables used below. All variables used in the 
interaction analysis are mean centered. The t-statistics are in parentheses, next to the coefficient 
estimates, and are computed based on standard errors clustered by analyst and firm. The symbols 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively, 
with probability levels one-tailed for hypothesized directional expectations. Industry and year 
fixed-effects are included in both models. The number of observations and goodness of fit statistics 
are reported at the bottom of the table.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Accounting complexity:       
ARC -0.262*** (-2.74) -0.260*** (-2.71) -0.276*** (-2.93) 
GEXP 0.083*** (6.04)     
ARC X GEXP 0.064** (1.79)     
FEXP   0.017 (1.14)   
ARC X FEXP   0.182*** (4.23)   
INDFOCUS     -0.022 (-0.42) 
ARC X INDFOCUS     0.482*** (3.38) 
       
Information environment:       
LOGMV 0.039* (1.70) 0.038* (1.65) 0.039* (1.72) 
IO 0.010*** (6.19) 0.010*** (6.26) 0.010*** (6.22) 
B/M -0.637*** (-4.91) -0.636*** (-4.90) -0.655*** (-5.03) 
GROWTH 0.151 (1.23) 0.146 (1.19) 0.155 (1.27) 
NEWS10K -4.644*** (-3.75) -4.660*** (-3.76) -4.662*** (-3.77) 
LOGFOLL_FOR 0.115** (2.53) 0.117** (2.55) 0.116** (2.56) 
       
Incentive to cover:       
TURN -0.000* (-1.67) -0.000* (-1.69) -0.000 (-1.55) 
ADV -0.342 (-0.66) -0.316 (-0.62) -0.421 (-0.84) 
RND 0.785*** (2.61) 0.785*** (2.61) 0.853*** (2.77) 
ROA 1.779*** (3.94) 1.792*** (3.97) 1.738*** (3.85) 
       
Complexity:       
FOROPS 0.117*** (2.79) 0.118*** (2.80) 0.117*** (2.79) 
LOGSGMT -0.013 (-0.43) -0.012 (-0.40) -0.007 (-0.24) 
EARNVOL -0.031*** (-4.02) -0.031*** (-4.01) -0.032*** (-4.07) 
FOG10K 0.013 (0.72) 0.012 (0.70) 0.012 (0.68) 
       
Uncertainty:       
STDRET -0.395*** (-6.54) -0.398*** (-6.58) -0.403*** (-6.69) 
LOSS -0.911*** (-8.19) -0.912*** (-8.19) -0.906*** (-8.17) 
       
Forecast attribute:       
FORAGE -0.178*** (-14.80) -0.178*** (-14.74) -0.178*** (-14.81) 
       
Intercept -0.043 (-0.11) -0.042 (-0.10) -0.035 (-0.09) 
Industry & Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 112,950  112,950  112,950  
R-square 0.255  0.254  0.255  
Adj. R-square 0.255  0.254  0.254  
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Table 8 – Analyst performance, account-specific accounting complexity and analysts’ 
account-specific expertise (H4) 
The table below presents the estimation results of the regression (using OLS) of accuracy at the forecast level on, 
account-specific complexity and expertise measures, general experience, and control variables. Table 1 defines all the 
variables used below. All variables used in the interaction analysis are mean centered. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses, next to the coefficient estimates, and are computed based on standard errors clustered by analyst and 
firm. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively, 
with probability levels one-tailed for hypothesized directional expectations. Industry and year fixed-effects are 
included in both models. The number of observations and goodness of fit statistics are reported at the bottom of the 
table.  
Panel A 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Accounting Complexity:       
ARC-FAIR -0.078** (-2.56)     
EXPRT-FAIR 0.096*** (5.35)     
ARC-FAIR X EXPRT-FAIR 0.071*** (4.74)     
ARC-DERIV   -0.121*** (-4.42)   
EXPRT-DERIV   0.051*** (3.00)   
ARC-DERIV X EXPRT-DERIV   0.044*** (3.25)   
ARC-PENS     -0.022 (-1.18) 
EXPRT-PENS     0.056*** (3.43) 
ARC-PENS X EXPRT-PENS     0.011 (1.10) 
       
Information environment:       
LOGMV 0.018 (0.86) 0.037* (1.70) 0.013 (0.57) 
IO 0.010*** (6.24) 0.010*** (6.16) 0.010*** (6.15) 
B/M -0.715*** (-5.55) -0.655*** (-5.24) -0.700*** (-5.62) 
GROWTH 0.182 (1.46) 0.163 (1.30) 0.183 (1.47) 
NEWS10K -4.612*** (-3.72) -4.643*** (-3.73) -4.625*** (-3.71) 
LOGFOLL_FOR 0.107** (2.36) 0.119*** (2.59) 0.120*** (2.61) 
       
Incentive to cover:       
TURN -0.000* (-1.69) -0.000* (-1.83) -0.000* (-1.87) 
ADV -0.134 (-0.26) -0.381 (-0.75) -0.121 (-0.23) 
RND 1.010*** (3.38) 0.830*** (2.77) 1.003*** (3.31) 
ROA 1.981*** (4.50) 1.848*** (4.09) 1.967*** (4.45) 
       
Complexity:       
FOROPS 0.104** (2.48) 0.114*** (2.73) 0.098** (2.32) 
LOGSGMT 0.007 (0.21) -0.012 (-0.40) -0.012 (-0.40) 
EARNVOL -0.033*** (-4.22) -0.031*** (-4.02) -0.033*** (-4.20) 
FOG10K 0.010 (0.58) 0.011 (0.64) 0.013 (0.73) 
       
Uncertainty:       
STDRET -0.395*** (-6.66) -0.399*** (-6.67) -0.385*** (-6.36) 
LOSS -0.890*** (-8.02) -0.909*** (-8.12) -0.906*** (-8.16) 
       
Forecast attribute:       
FORAGE -0.174*** (-14.41) -0.177*** (-14.61) -0.175*** (-14.31) 
       
Intercept 0.196 (0.48) 0.041 (0.10) 0.133 (0.32) 
Industry & Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 112,950  112,950  112,950  
R-square 0.255  0.255  0.254  
Adj. R-square 0.255  0.255  0.253  
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Table 8 – Panel B 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Accounting Complexity:       
ARC-FAIR -0.075** (-2.47)     
EXPRT-FAIR 0.082*** (4.31)     
ARC-FAIR X EXPRT-FAIR 0.070*** (4.44)     
ARC-DERIV   -0.116*** (-4.27)   
EXPRT-DERIV   0.035* (1.91)   
ARC-DERIV X EXPRT-DERIV   0.042*** (2.91)   
ARC-PENS     -0.020 (-1.06) 
EXPRT-PENS     0.045*** (2.69) 
ARC-PENS X EXPRT-PENS     0.012 (1.13) 
GEXP 0.053*** (3.66) 0.070*** (4.59) 0.065*** (4.44) 
ARC-FAIR X GEXP 0.001 (0.10)     
ARC-DERIV X GEXP   0.004 (0.29)   
ARC-PENS X GEXP     -0.016 (-1.76) 
       
Information environment:       
LOGMV 0.018 (0.83) 0.037* (1.67) 0.013 (0.56) 
IO 0.010*** (6.20) 0.010*** (6.11) 0.010*** (6.11) 
B/M -0.714*** (-5.54) -0.655*** (-5.25) -0.700*** (-5.61) 
GROWTH 0.185 (1.48) 0.168 (1.34) 0.185 (1.48) 
NEWS10K -4.609*** (-3.72) -4.634*** (-3.72) -4.617*** (-3.70) 
LOGFOLL_FOR 0.108** (2.38) 0.119*** (2.60) 0.120*** (2.62) 
       
Incentive to cover:       
TURN -0.000* (-1.67) -0.000* (-1.80) -0.000* (-1.86) 
ADV -0.154 (-0.30) -0.413 (-0.81) -0.169 (-0.32) 
RND 1.007*** (3.37) 0.822*** (2.74) 0.983*** (3.24) 
ROA 1.980*** (4.50) 1.849*** (4.09) 1.968*** (4.45) 
       
Complexity:       
FOROPS 0.104** (2.48) 0.113*** (2.71) 0.098** (2.31) 
LOGSGMT 0.006 (0.18) -0.013 (-0.42) -0.011 (-0.36) 
EARNVOL -0.033*** (-4.20) -0.031*** (-4.00) -0.033*** (-4.19) 
FOG10K 0.010 (0.59) 0.011 (0.65) 0.013 (0.71) 
       
Uncertainty:       
STDRET -0.396*** (-6.66) -0.399*** (-6.68) -0.386*** (-6.37) 
LOSS -0.889*** (-8.02) -0.908*** (-8.12) -0.906*** (-8.17) 
       
Forecast attribute:       
FORAGE -0.175*** (-14.47) -0.178*** (-14.67) -0.176*** (-14.35) 
       
Intercept 0.195 (0.48) 0.053 (0.13) 0.157 (0.38) 
Industry & Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 112,950  112,950  112,950  
R-square 0.256  0.256  0.254  
Adj. R-square 0.255  0.256  0.254  
 
